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Abstrak 
Artikel ini mendiskusikan gerakan Front Pembela Islam (FPI) 
di Indonesia dengan menyorot pada beberapa poin: 1) faktor 
dan konteks geopolitik yang mempengaruhi munculnya FPI; 2) 
ideologi kelompok FPI; dan 3) perkembangan FPI di 
Indonesia. Dalam perkembangannya, gerakan FPI sering kali 
menimbulkan kontroversi. Mereka mengklaim dirinya sebagai 
representasi kaum Muslim yang bertugas untuk memantau 
sekaligus memerintahkan umat Muslim untuk berbuat baik dan 
melarang mereka dari berbuat jahat (al-amr bi al-ma’rûf wa al-
nahy ‘an al-munkar). Namun dalam praktiknya, mereka 
menjustifikasi langkah-langkah yang tidak konstitusional 
(seperti aksi kekerasan) demi menegakkan jargon tersebut. Di 
sisi lain, FPI tidak hanya keberatan terhadap kebobrokan 
sosial, tapi juga menentang eksistensi kelompok minoritas 
seperti Syi’ah dan Ahmadiyah. Dengan model gerakan takfiri, 
FPI secara konstan beranjak untuk mengembangkan budaya 
takut dalam masyarakat. Hal ini tentu menjadi tantangan serius 
bagi masyarakat Indonesia yang mendambakan kedamaian dan 
harmoni sosial. Pemerintah dalam hal ini perlu mengambil 
sikap yang tegas untuk melawan tindakan-tindakan intoleran 
melalui penegakan hukum yang serius, sekaligus menyebarkan 
pesan-pesan perdamaian. Jika tidak, kekuatan-kekuatan tak 
beradab itu akan terus berkembang dengan aksi-aksi teror yang 
meresahkan masyarakat. 
Kata kunci: FPI, Kekerasan, Intoleransi. 
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Introduction 
Indonesia has been facing enormous changes after the 1998 
Reformasi. After the fall of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime, Indonesia has 
gone through flux and reflux in its process of democratization. In spite 
of some developments in politics and economy, Indonesia still needs to 
learn more democracy, especially concerning religion, over which the 
lives of many religious minorities are in jeopardy. Sudarto—a researcher 
at Bhineka Tunggal Ika National Alliance—reported that out of 2392 
violent events in 2014, 65% or 1554 of them, were triggered by religious 
factors.1 This fantastic number indicates that religious violence continues 
to grow. This fact also denotes that the play of religious identity is 
becoming stronger in public space.  
Indonesia had always been a heaven for various faiths and 
traditions at least till 1998. Although Muslims constituted 87% of 
Indonesian society, there had never been such high numbers of religious 
violence as we have now. Various groups were living peacefully one 
among others and were respecting each other’s beliefs, regardless of the 
variety of faiths and ethnicities. Irrespective of the negative effect of 
homogenization imposed by the Soeharto regime, national identity 
appeared to be strong. It can be said that “being an Indonesian” is 
people’s first identity prior to religious and ethnic identity. But what does 
it mean to be Indonesian? In brief, to be Indonesian means to accept the 
philosophical foundation of Indonesia as a sovereign state, which is 
Bhineka Tunggal Ika, or unity in diversity.  
But the significance of national identity diminished gradually as 
fundamentalism rose publicly in 1998. It is palpable that the reformasi was 
not only a victory for the advocates of democracy, but also for religious 
radicalism that used the moment to initiate religious “reform”. Right 
after the fall of Soeharto, a group of puritan hadrami (habâib) launched 
publicly an organization called Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders 
Front) henceforth known as FPI—to defend the rights of Muslims 
                                                          
1 Rinaldy Sofwan Fakhrana, “Agama Jadi Faktor Utama Penyulut Kekerasan”, in 
http://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20141115090933-20-11663/agama-jadi-
faktor-utama-penyulut-kekerasan/, accessed on April 28, 15.  
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everywhere, particularly in Indonesia. Yet, FPI has always been a 
controversial movement in Indonesian society. The organization aims at 
becoming a moral fighter enjoining the good and forbidding wrong (al-
‘amr bi al-ma’rûf wa al-nahy al-munkar) in the society. It claims to take over 
the duties of putting the society in order as it claims the government 
failed to do. However, in the course of its development, FPI generally 
uses violence to stop what they call al-munkarât (evil deeds). Because of 
this recourse to violence, criticisms are commonly addressed to them in 
spite of their growing number of followers.  
FPI is a consequence of the unsuccessful governing system that 
failed to promote civic pluralism in the society. On a larger scale, FPI 
also points to the crisis of Indonesia as a nation-state, its failure in 
managing the lives of its people in many sectors. Soeharto’s failure to 
build effective communication with Islamists helped worsen the 
relationship between them and government and led to triggering 
Islamists to rebel against the government. 
This article discusses the FPI movement, addressing its initial 
backdrop, its ideology and its development in Indonesia. To help the 
flow of the discussion, this article is systematized as follows; first, this 
article is outlined as the geopolitical context of Indonesia that motivated 
the emergence of FPI as an Islamic defenders front. In this section, it 
discusses how politicians took advantage of the establishment of the 
group to support their political agenda. Second, this article discusses 
FPI’s ideology, its identity formation and its movement. And in the last 
section, I discuss how the FPI advances such ideology to Indonesian 
society and how it has massively changed the religious-socio-political 
landscape of Indonesia. Focusing my paper on the struggle of FPI as a 
defender of Islam, I aim to show how this movement has massively 
contributed to changing the face of Indonesian Islam. 
 
The Birth of Front Pembela Islam (FPI) 
There are long historical episodes of socio-political dynamics that 
undergird the establishment and development of FPI as an Islamist 
movement. There are at least four explanations of why FPI emerged. 
 248|Maurisa Zinira – The Movement of Islamic Defenders Front and Its Socio Political Influence  
They include (a) failure of the national secular government to promote 
civic pluralism, (b) a reaction to political disenfranchisement and 
exclusion from democracy, (c) globalization and (d) modernization and 
global rise of fundamentalism.  
FPI was established in August 1998 as the first Islamic group 
founded after the fall of New Order regime. It was initiated by a group 
of habâib, ustâdh and ulamâ’ (mostly were from Jakarta) who gathered in al-
Umm Islamic Boarding School to celebrate Indonesia’s independence 
day as well as to discuss numerous issues ranging from human right 
violation to political struggle, in which some Muslims claimed to have 
been discriminated by the secular government.2 Indeed, FPI is a reaction 
to the New Order’s hostile policies against religion; it was established to 
reclaim Muslims’ rights in Indonesia, which the nationalist New Order 
had confiscated from Muslims.   
The FPI reaction represents religious-socio political grievances of 
many Islamists in Indonesia. Those grievances date back to the early 
establishment of Indonesia as a state, when Islamists and nationalists 
debated over the state ideology and over the management of the religion 
and state relationship. The religionists as represented by Mohammad 
Natsir argued that with Muslims being the largest population in 
Indonesia, Indonesia should automatically become an Islamic state to 
ensure accommodation to its majority inhabitants.  Yet, nationalists like 
Soekarno argued against such a concept as it would discriminate against 
other non-Muslims citizens, pointing out that Indonesia had various 
diverse populations regarding religion, ethnicity, race and culture.3 
Soekarno further suggested that religion should be a matter of private 
concern and should not be a final authority in determining what so-
called “truth”.4 However, to respond to Muslims’ anxieties over 
protection of religion rights (from not implementing Sharia law), 
                                                          
2 Jajang Jahroni, Defending the Majesty of Islam: Indonesia’s Front Pembela Islam, 1998-2003 
(Thailand: Silkworm Book, 2008), 18. 
3 Arskal Salim, Challenging The Secular State: The Islamization of Law in Modern Indonesia 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008), 56. 
4 Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942 (Singapore: Oxford 
University Press, 1973), 322. 
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Soekarno advised Muslims to increase their representatives in parliament 
because it would enable them to influence state policies concordant with 
Islamic values.5 
After a long debate on that matter, the parliament decided to not 
fulfill the demands of either Islamists’ to establish an Islamic state or 
nationalists’ to separate the state from religion. The result of the long 
debated concept of state ideology instead was the birth of PANCASILA, 
which enforces monotheism on Indonesian ideology.6 Nonetheless, 
some Islamists insisted on clear recognition of Islam as a form of state 
accommodation to the Muslims majority. On June 22, 1945, they insisted 
on the sentence “with an obligation for Muslims to implement Sharia 
law” into the 1945 constitutional, making it regulation for the 
presidential election mechanism, requiring that all candidates running for 
election are Muslims. But parliament vehemently opposed such 
insistence and refused, to insert idea of Sharia law, worrying that 
Christians of Eastern Indonesia would separate from Indonesia.7 
Outside the political debate in the parliament, those who were 
disappointed with their parliamentary representatives rebelled against the 
state. They collected themselves in a movement called Darul Islam 
(Indonesian Movement for an Islamic State)—led by Sekamadji Maridjan 
Kartosoewirjo, who attempted to establish an Islamic State regulated by 
Sharia law. This group grew out disappointment with the ruling regime, 
and was reportedly the pioneer of radical groups in Indonesia. Albeit the 
movement was dismantled in the 1960s following the killing of its key 
leaders, its network survived and spawned the biggest terrorist group in 
Southeast Asia—Jemaah Islamiyah.  
In the next stage of Indonesia’s development as a new state, the 
New Order regime under Soeharto used Pancasila to enforce its concept 
of military-based “integralism”. This concept conceives state and society 
                                                          
5 Salim, Challenging The Secular State, 56. 
6 Bassam Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Order (Los 
Angles: University of California Press, 2002), 49. 
7 Douglas Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance (New 
York: Routledge, 1995), 14. 
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as an organic totality; therefore, it gives less priority to personal rights or 
limits on the state’s power, and but puts more emphasis on social 
obligation.8 In support of this policy, the state held several programs on 
citizenship for all elements of inserting Pancasila moral values through 
educations. By doing so, the state expected people to know their duties 
as citizens and respect the role of the state in maintaining social order. 
Interestingly, Soeharto managed to distance the state from affinities of 
religion. Any mass movement (religious or non-religious alike) was 
therefore considered as threatening the social order, which in turn 
permits the state to use military action to enforce societal peace. 
In spite of the relatively weak power of (Muslim) religious 
radicals, religious minorities under Soeharto did simultaneously 
experience structural discrimination. The definition of what constitutes 
agama (religion) and kepercayaan (belief), for instance, had made followers 
of indigenous religions second-class citizens in the country. This is 
because to have a faith considered as an agama, a belief should follow 
certain criteria; first, it serves as an encompassing way of life with 
concrete regulation; second, it should have a teaching about the oneness 
of God; third, it should have a holy book that codifies a message 
revealed to prophet(s) through a holy spirit; and fourth, it should be led 
by a prophet. Any faith failed that failed to meet all these criteria is 
henceforth called kepercayaan, which according to Ministry of Religion 
Decree No. 9/1952/Article VI understood as “a school of belief …a 
dogmatic opinion, which is closely connected to the living tradition of 
several tribes, especially of those tribes that are still backward. The core 
of their belief is everything which has become the customary way of life 
of their ancestors over time”. By such definition, kepercayaan is 
understood to be more traditional, local and superstitious.  In this 
respect, followers of indigenous religion could not share the same 
privileges of good jobs and educations as the believers of agama 
(religion), allegedly because they were considered ‘backward’. 
On the other hand, under the banner of keeping order, Pancasila 
was also used to act against opposition primarily Islamic groups 
                                                          
8 Ibid, 18. 
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reputedly resisting Pancasila. Soeharto’s secularist policies during his 
leadership hindered Islamists from enjoying the power. Many Islamists 
were frustrated at their powerlessness. In the 1980s for instance, the 
government restricted religious expression in public places. The regime 
also banned the use of religious attributes in state offices. Resistance was 
considered a high crime that might result in detention. 
It is clear that Soeharto was extremely aware of the potential 
power of Muslims society. Therefore, in much of his engagement with 
Islam, he refused to give much room for the religion to operate beyond 
his control. Many Muslims were killed for being critical of government 
policies as the regime adamantly refused to give any space Islamists, who 
had supposedly endorsed the formalization of the religion-state 
relationship to develop their movements.9 Soeharto’s hostile treatment of 
Muslims’ political aspirations made his fall a victory for Islamists, who 
were able to move more freely under democracy. Islamist organization 
emerged virtually everywhere. FPI itself was among the first founded in 
1998 as a religious civil organization aimed at struggling for Muslims’ 
rights. With support from several national leaders and military 
commanders, FPI developed fast and recruited huge numbers of 
Muslims across Indonesia. 
But the closeness of FPI and the military officials were not 
without political baggage. Jajang Jahroni explained that the military gave 
FPI a great deal of support, including money and military training. Such 
training was made in anticipation of emergency situation, to help military 
operate within society.10 One may also argue that the military approach 
to FPI was intended to counter criticism by left-wing groups about 
abuses committed by the military during the New Order regime. The 
military’s alliance with the FPI therefore was an endeavor to deflect such 
criticisms and to reduce public animosity against the military. Using the 
rhetoric of ‘Muslims generals should rule the military system’, the FPI 
welcomed the support of the military and enjoyed the privileges it gained 
from the relationship. However, it is worth noting that the 
Muslims/military relationship is dynamic and really depends on the 
                                                          
9 Ramage, Politics in Indonesia, 189. 
10 Jahroni, Defending the Majesty of Islam, 18. 
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political situation of the moment. In today’s context, their relationship is 
not as harmonious as it was before, partly because the FPI tends to be 
more violent and destructive in exercising its force, moving beyond what 
military officials initially expected.    
In addition to the above factors, the emergence of FPI was also 
motivated by the rise of global fundamentalism. Fundamentalism itself is 
the contemporary outgrowth of tensions between the secular worldview 
of cultural modernity and the cultural worldview of exclusive 
monotheism.11 In Indonesia, Islamic fundamentalism never really had 
chances to demonstrate its force until after 1998. Tibi wrote: 
“Clearly, Islamic civilization is characterized by great cultural 
diversity. During my visit to Indonesia and Malaysia in Spring 
1995, I encountered Arab Muslims and even local Muslims who 
had studied at Al-Azhar Cairo or at Saudi universities and had 
thus become scripture—oriented fundamentalist in disdaining the 
local cultures as not truly Islamic because they are not inspired by 
the scripture in its original tongue; these zealots spread views 
infringing upon local cultures in an effort to impose upon them a 
neo-absolutist understanding of scriptural Arab—centric Islam. 
Happily, these fundamentalists in Southeast Asia are no more than 
an irritant at the periphery of society, and not, as their 
counterparts in the Middle East, a force at the center of 
politics.”12 
In 1995, Islamic fundamentalism did not pose as a great 
challenge for Indonesian Islam as it does now. But as religion starts 
gaining its power in public space, especially with the emergence of an 
uncivil force like FPI, the face of Indonesian Islam gradually changes. 
 
FPI’s Ideology and Movement 
The emergence of FPI prefigures the growth of radical Islam in 
Indonesia. Since its initial establishment, FPI has performed myriad 
destructive actions against what they call munkarât (corruption). In 1998 
                                                          
11 Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism, 68. 
12 Ibid, 49. 
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itself, FPI reportedly mobilized crowds to fight against bandits who 
destroyed a mosque and local residents’ houses in Ketapang, Jakarta. 
This tragedy led a mob of people to burn down four churches, destroy a 
hotel, three schools and seven houses, and kill at least thirteen people.13 
This violence happened following the destruction of a mosque by a 
group of non-religious affiliated gangsters who were angry after a dispute 
over parking space. Though many parties lamented FPI’s overwhelming 
reaction tin destroying churches and schools, FPI did not regret its 
behavior and refused any suggested changes in its organization. It 
became apparent that FPI’s destructive attitude is inherent in the group’s 
ideology in which it claims to be the defender of Islam. In fact, to know 
FPI is to understand more about its ideologue—Rizieq Shihab—whose 
understanding of Islam has been central to shaping FPI’s ideology and 
identity.   
It can be said that one cannot talk about FPI without talking 
about Rizieq Shihab and vice versa. Shihab is the main reference of FPI’s 
ideology. Although it was not his initiative alone to establish FPI, Shihab 
has been central to the movement both as an ideologue and as the 
highest commander of the movement. The personality of Shihab is 
therefore influential for FPI, and the character of FPI take on both his 
identity and epistemology.   
Rizieq Shihab’s personality is quite unique as he maintains dual 
ethnicities on the same time. On one hand, he wants to preserve his 
hadrami14 identity, and on another hand, he maintains his Indonesian 
identity. As a result, Rizieq’s adoption of Arab tradition, either cultural or 
intellectual, influences, even supports his nationalism as an Indonesian. 
His identity differs from that of other religious extremists in Indonesia 
whose nationalism has been eroded in favor of caliphate.  
                                                          
13 Yunita Trihandidi, “Insiden Jalan Ketapang November 1998”, in 
http://umarabduh.blog.com/2011/06/30/insiden-jalan-ketapang-november-1998/, 
accessed on 28 April 2015.   
14 Hadrami are people who come from Hadramaut, a province in South Yemen. They 
came to Indonesia even before colonial trading began. There is no record of their 
number in Indonesia since they have intermarried with the locals.  
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Observing the way FPI members dress, we could easily identify 
similarities to Middle Eastern style of clothing, despite their pledge of 
loyalty to Indonesia. Shihab himself has never been seen wearing other 
dresses than a cloak and a turban. Though he does not condemn modern 
clothes, he prefers to wear modest dress since he believes that wearing 
such dress can preserve his inherited identity and tradition as hadrami-
born. Shihab himself is a Betawi15 born from a puritan Hadrami circle. 
Being part of Betawi community, Shihab has been exposed to a culture 
that emphasizes the role of jawara/hero in community. Martial arts are 
part of the tradition that Betawis attempt to preserve. Therefore, it is not 
surprising to know that Shihab seems to be obsessed with being a moral 
fighter or a defender of religion through risking his life attacking many 
people.  
Personal experience and education are determinant factors 
shaping Shihab’s understanding of religion. He spent his elementary and 
secondary school years at secular institutions. He even once studied at 
Bethel Christian Middle School at Petamburan. He further continued his 
studies to SMAN 6 (state high school) and took Arabic class at LIPIA 
(Islamic and Arabic College of Indonesia)—a Saudi Arabia system-based 
institution in Jakarta in 1983. However, being perceived to be 
troublesome youth whose penchant was fighting, his family sent him to 
Saudi Arabia to continue his studies at King Saud University, majoring in 
Fiqh and Ushul Fiqh, and Education. Upon completion of his degree, 
Shihab continued his studies, taking graduate program at Universitas 
Antar Bangsa,16 majoring in Sharia law Malaysia. Shihab wrote a thesis 
titled “Pengaruh Pancasila dalam Pelaksanaan Syari’at Islam di 
Indonesia” (The Influence of Pancasila on the Implementation of Sharia 
                                                          
15 Betawi people are descendants of people living around Batavia (Jakarta) area since the 
17th century. They are a mixed ethnic group came from various parts of Indonesia as 
well as foreign countries mostly Arab, Chinese and Indians. 
16 “Profil Habib Rizieq” in http://www.habibrizieq.com/p/profil-habib-rizieq.html/, 
accessed on 29 April 2015.  
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Law in Indonesia).17 Upon completing his M.A, Shihab continued his 
doctoral program at the same university and wrote a doctoral dissertation 
titled “The Distinction of Origins and Branches of Ahl-Sunnah wa al-
Jama’ah”.18 It is then, most likely that his religious education has been 
influential in shaping his religious ideology and epistemology. His life in 
Saudi Arabia was his personal religious exposure that brought him to 
understanding Islam in its formalistic way. Malaysia also has been known 
for its Saudi Arabian style of religious education that contributed to 
shaping his Sharia—minded epistemology.       
Rizieq Shihab’s formalistic understanding of Sharia serves to be 
determinant factor that motivated him to conduct a da’wa focusing on al-
’amr bi al-ma‘rûf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar (commanding righteousness and 
preventing corruptions). Shihab as well as FPI view Indonesian society 
as corrupted by the adoption of Western’s values and ideologies. They 
believe that multidimensional crises that Indonesia encounters these days 
have been consequences of Indonesia’s Western-affiliated politics and 
economics as well as the adoption of secular laws that are inappropriate 
for Indonesian cultures.19 The many problems faced by Indonesia are 
forms of God’s punishment. Therefore, the only way to solve such crises 
is by implementing Sharia law that has been designed as guidance for 
Muslims’ daily lives.20 Unlike other fundamentalists who propose Sharia 
as substitution for secular law, FPI proposes that certain ideas derived 
from Islamic teachings be integrated into national law.21 Adoption of 
Islamic law does not necessarily mean the establishment of an Islamic 
state because FPI believes that the Qur’an does not require Muslims to 
establish an Islamic state.22  
                                                          
17 “Habib Rizieq: Si goen Ingin Menggurui Saya dan Abu Bakar Ba’asyir tentang Iman” 
in http://www.arrahmah.com/read/2008/07/04/2012-habib-rizieq-si-goen-ingin-
menggurui-saya-dan-abubakar-baasyir-tentang-iman.html/, accessed on 29 April 2015.  
18 “Profile” in http://dr-kamaluddin-nurdin.blogspot.com/p/profile.html/, accessed 29 
April 2015.  
19 Jahroni, Defending the Majesty of Islam, 37. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 39. 
22 Ibid., 40. 
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FPI has been very active campaigning for implementation of 
Islamic law. It has proposed drafts of laws against ma’siyah 
(transgression/disobedience), arguing that such acts have become a 
social disease not only within the Muslim, but also within the non-
Muslim community. But what FPI means by ma’siyah is not clearly 
defined since FPI does not offer criteria for so-called morally good 
deeds. For instance, FPI not only attempts to prevent the spread of 
alcoholism, narcotics, pornography, prostitution, etc, but it also insists 
on all restaurants closing during the daytime during Ramad }an, stating 
that such activity disrespects Muslims’ worship during the month.   
Being frustrated and angered by Indonesian law enforcement, 
FPI started using destructive and violent means to prevent what it sees 
as corruption (an-nahy ‘an al-munkar). In many occasions, FPI claims to 
take over government’s role in combating “social disease” because the 
government is considered not serious in preventing the so-called social 
evil proliferating in society. But FPI is fully aware that its destructive 
actions are against the law. Therefore, before physical attack, FPI always 
notifies any groups it claims to have violated the law to comply with 
constitutional rules, otherwise, FPI will have justification to shut those 
institutions down.23 According to Jajang, FPI is quite procedural in 
executing its action. One of FPI members says: 
“Illegal practices are intolerable. When the authorities respond to 
our notices and warnings, the problem is over. Why should we 
waste time and energy chartering buses and mobilizing people? 
We are not paid anyway. We pay them…Everything is procedural. 
We are good citizens. We have to stress that. If the higher 
authorities respond to our report and handle the problems, then 
the problem is over…when water is unchanneled, what happens? 
It floods everywhere. We can flood the city”.24 
In fact, FPI’s destructive actions are expressions of frustration 
because the society they want to live in does not really exist. So violence 
becomes the expression of their disappointment. Violence seems the 
only means for FPI to send messages to its opponents to comply with 
                                                          
23 Ibid, 33. 
24 Ibid, 35. 
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what FPI defines as ma‘rûf (good). And of course, what is understood as 
morally “good” is constructed. One may argue that discothèques and 
bars are legal, Ahmadiyya and other faith groups are protected by the 
state, but FPI has no concern whether these institutions are 
constitutionally legal. What it concerns about is the moral threat these 
institutions are said to bring to Muslim community.   
This reminds me of Mark Juergensmeyer’s thesis that violence 
can successfully send its message when three requirements are taken into 
consideration: the location where acts are committed, the time when 
violence is performed and the possibility for violence to reach its 
audience.25 Targets of violence normally are places that symbolize power 
of the power of the target. Therefore, since brothels, bars and cafés are 
perceived to be symbols of ma‘siyah, FPI’s attacks on them are meant to 
influence public’s perception. FPI’s control of the territory defines its 
public authority.26 
According to Juergensmeyer, violence as an act of terrorism is 
meant to terrify its audiences.27 In regard to FPI’s action, the attack is 
meant to frighten its opponents into renouncing their business. Because 
violence is about performance, FPI always reveals their group identity 
either through their dress or the face they uncover in order to convey 
FPI power to the public masses. Most of the time, FPI runs its patrols 
during Islamic holy days/months. Normally during Ramad }an, after 
performing tarâwîh (additional prayer during the nights of Ramad }an), FPI 
begins their activities, targeting pubs, casinos, brothels, etc. But unlike 
other radical groups, who always mask their face, FPI members are 
confident in claiming violence they perform. Apparently, FPI wants to 
tell the crowds the failure of the state to enforce law on social morality 
such as gambling, drugs, prostitution, etc. But more importantly, FPI’s 
performance of violence is directed (mostly) to force the government to 
take action against munkarât (corruption). 
                                                          
25 Mark Juergesmeyer, Terror in The Mind of Good: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Los 
Angles: University of California Press, 2003), 121-147. 
26 Ibid, 134. 
27 Ibid, 5. 
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FPI and its Religious Socio-Political Influence in Indonesian 
Society  
The emergence of FPI has completely turned the face of 
Indonesia that has long been perceived as the model for moderate Islam, 
into one of the more violent Muslim societies.28 In spite of its small 
number, FPI has pioneered radical shift in the making of Indonesian 
Islam. Initially, Indonesian Islam has always emphasized on 
implementation of Sharia at substantial level, which is the 
implementation of core teachings of Islam, but such tradition has slowly 
eroded with the global rise of fundamentalism, under which radical 
group like FPI extensively demands for the implementation of Sharia at 
formal level, making Sharia into state laws. 
In regard to religion, FPI has posed a serious real threat for 
religious harmony. FPI has always demanded for total disbanding of any 
religious movement deemed as defaming Islam, especially Ahmadiyya, 
which FPI perceives as a religious deviation from orthodox Islam.29 FPI 
often attacked Ahmadiyya communities and burnt down their mosques 
and houses, causing Ahmadis’ displacement of the Ahmadis in in many 
places. It is not exaggeration to say, therefore, that FPI’s action has been 
troublesome for many people. FPI has posed great threats to interfaith 
relationships, especially because FPI often uses violence as a means to 
send messages to its opponents.    
Regrettably, government does not either at the local or the 
national level, seem to worry about the growth of such uncivil forces in 
Indonesia. Government official rather facilitate FPI demands by 
                                                          
28 “Religious Hostilities Reach Six Year High”, in http://-
www.pewforum.org/2014/01/14/religious-hostilities-reach-six-year-high/, accessed on 
1 May 2015. 
29 Ahmadiyya is perceived as deviant because it declares Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as the 
last prophet after Muhammad. Though Ahmadis deny such accusation, many believe 
that Ahmadis have been dishonest. The same allegation is designated to Shi’ites who 
were said to perform taqiyya (unrevealing identity when in peril). 
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disbanding Ahmadiyya movement as the way to end violence. In 2008 
for instance, the government issued a joint decree signed by the Ministry 
of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Attorney 
General’s offices with support of West Java governor’s office, declaring 
the Ahmadiyya as a deviant movement. Simultaneously, the government 
of East Java issued an official statement naming Shi’a as blasphemous 
movement, banning them from the region, and lending radical 
movements justification to take actions against them. These actions mark 
a great shift in the state-religion relationship in contemporary Indonesia. 
While the New Order regime often politicized religion to reinforce its 
power, the Indonesian government after Reformasi is rather religionized 
by religious leaders—successors of the Islamists who loudly campaigned 
for the implementation Sharia law.   
Intolerant movements like FPI have long been the concern of 
human right defenders because the group often incites hatred and 
violence through its actions. In most cases, FPI triggers horizontal 
conflicts that end in clashes between FPI and its opponents; mostly 
between FPI and local people. The most recent incident happened in 
2013 in Kendal—Central Java, where a mob of people burnt an FPI’s 
car, after it accidentally killed a pedestrian as he passed by the 
discotheque where the FPI was patrolling.30  This incident created a 
public outcry against the movement. Many have called on the 
government to disband the organization. But it is unlikely that the 
government will want to do so.31 
However, in spite of criticism and rejection by many people, FPI 
successfully attracts people to join the movement. The most conspicuous 
factor that supports the increased number of FPI members is its 
religious language that is familiar to most Indonesian Muslims. 
                                                          
30 The conflict started with local people who were displeased by FPI’s patrol and 
rebuked the group, demanding them to not create tumult in their neighborhood. Their 
reprimand, however, was confronted by FPI, which eventually led them into a quarrel. 
FPI members frightened by the increased numbers of local residents, attempted to 
escape but accidentally killed one person from the neighborhood. 
31 Government refuses to ban the movement arguing that such disbanding would be 
undemocratic.   
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Obligation to command righteousness and fight against evils (al-’amr bi 
al-ma‘rûf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar) seems simple to follow for lower class 
urban Muslims who feel socially and religiously deprived. It is this battle 
against evil that Juergenmeyer calls as “cosmic war” that attracts 
marginalized persons to participate in such a war. They hope by such 
participation to be considered meaningful to society. FPI itself has been 
skilled in such recruitment, especially recruiting people who have 
experienced loss of integrity/crisis of identity. The idea of cosmic war 
gives them assurance about being meaningful both in this world and the 
afterlife. With regard to total number however, Muchsin Alatas—the 
current leader of FPI—claims to have seven million members across 
Indonesia.32 This number is actually small compared to total number of 
Indonesian Muslims that reaches up to 207,176,162 among the total 
citizenry of 237,641,326.33  Although total number of FPI supporters is 
relatively small, their violent activities are a huge threat for Indonesian 
society, especially for the future of moderate Indonesian Islam. 
 
Conclusion 
The growth of FPI is a consequence of the multidimensional 
crisis in Indonesia. It is the result of government’s inability to 
accommodate the basic needs of citizens as well as to manage diversity 
and promote civic pluralism. FPI is also a reaction to political 
disenfranchisement and exclusion from democracy, globalization and 
modernization and to the global rise of fundamentalism. 
The “Homogenization” strategy of the New Order regime made 
people less aware of differences. The emergence of individual identity in 
public space challenged the FPI and similar groups to appreciate 
diversity and to share public space with others. Before the 1998 
Reformasi, Ahmadiyya and Shi’a were never perceived as deviant and had 
                                                          
32 Megiza, “Muchsin Alatas: Jumlah Kami Sudah 7 Juta” in 
http://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20141008165430-12-5780/muchsin-alatas-
jumlah-kami-sudah-7-juta/, accessed on 29 April 15. 
33 “Index Menurut Wilayah dan Agama yang Dianut” in 
http://sp2010.bps.go.id/index.php/site/tabel?tid=321/, accessed on 29 April 2015.  
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never experienced persecution. It was only after the 1998 Reformasi, when 
Indonesia started exercising democracy that religious minority existence 
became a threat for Muslim extremists like FPI.     
FPI has declared themselves representative of Indonesian 
Muslims and claims the right to dominate public space. It demands that 
Muslims occupy many strategic positions in state office to be able to 
implement Sharia law. Therefore, when the former vice governor of 
Jakarta—Basuki Tjahja Purnama—rose to governorship replacing the 
former governor who won presidential election in 2014, FPI held 
massive demonstration against Purnama’s inauguration. In their 
speeches/orations, FPI leaders declared that their objection to Purnama 
was due to his religion and ethnicity as a Christian and as a Chinese 
descendent.  FPI designated Purnama as ‘kâfir’ (infidel) who must be 
rejected as ruler of Muslims’ predominant region—Jakarta. This takfîr (to 
declare someone as ‘kafir’ or unbliever), according to Bassam Tibi, is an 
ideological weapon of Islamic fundamentalism to legitimize rejection and 
allows the use of violence against foes.34  
Takfirism is inherent in FPI’s ideology. Years before, FPI had 
targeted young thinkers affiliated to Jaringan Islam Liberal (Liberal Islam 
Network—JIL) as kâfir due to their progressive understanding of Islam. 
The FPI’s opposition to this movement can be seen as a rejection to 
what Tibi calls “cultural modernity”. Yet for me, FPI’s stance on takfirism 
is also problematic because Rizieq Shihab once stated that any group 
willing to call others ‘kâfir’ should be powerfully opposed. He admitted 
that groups like Wahhabi and Shi’a are divided into two, the moderate 
and the extreme. Muslims need to be firm in fighting against the extreme 
ones, he said.35  This, of course, shows FPI’s inconsistency with regard to 
takfirism. Apparently, FPI does not have stable position relevant to this.   
FPI is not an isolated case in itself; it rather represents the global 
transformation of the Muslim world. What happened in Indonesia is an 
impact of such global changes. Globalization has made transformations 
                                                          
34 Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism, 99. 
35 “Habib Rizieq Syihab: Perangi Syiah dan Wahabi yang Sesat” in 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RIAkTyPKBgg/, accessed on 30 April 2015.  
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fast. With the emergence of sophisticated technologies and Indonesian 
students studying at Middle Eastern universities, Middle Eastern 
ideologies and epistemologies are instilled in Indonesia. In Egypt, 
Muslim brotherhood was initially a civil movement. However, it changed 
its strategy, turning from a merely civil organization into political party 
when the da‘wah strategy through civil movement no longer functioned. 
With the similar reason, FPI possibly transforms its da‘wah into political 
struggle because unlike other extremist groups that distance themselves 
from politics, FPI is not allergic to it.  
FPI alone has turned the face of Indonesia’s moderate Muslims 
society into a more radical one, but I am emphasizing that FPI 
symbolizes this change as it appeared publicly for the first time after the 
1998 Reformasi. Throughout its operative period, FPI has frequently been 
criticized for being very violent and destructive. This causes many to 
propose that the government disband such an uncivil force from 
operating in the society.  One may argue that such restriction violates 
principles of democracy since religious mass organizations like FPI do 
have right of free speech, however, I would rather suggest that the 
government rely on constitutional rule to control such uncivil 
movement. The government can charge the movement with criminal 
behavior whenever that is proven. 
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